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This article addresses the question of the geographical scope of the ‘age of revolutions’ (c. 
1750-1850) through the case of a peasant uprising in Mount Lebanon in 1821. This uprising 
has similarities with recent and contemporary revolutions and rebellions, which have led 
some to suggest the influence of the ideas of the French revolution of 1789 or the Greek 
revolution of 1821. This article argues that influence at the level of ideas was unimportant, 
but that the similarities can plausibly be traced to similar and connected contexts at the level 
of political economy, as the expansion and crisis of military-fiscal states provoked opposition 
‘from below’ and renegotiations of sovereignty. This focus on political economy rather than 
genealogies of ideas, the piece suggests, can then help define an ‘age of revolutions’ 
extending beyond Europe and the North Atlantic into the Ottoman empire, Latin America, 
and other regions. 
Keywords 
 
1 My thanks to Joanna Innes and Maurizio Isabella for their comments on drafts of this 
article; and to other participants in the Political Economy and Culture in Global History 
Reading Group at Oxford, and Jeremy Adelman at Princeton, for discussion of its themes. 
 2 
revolution, popular politics, global history, Ottoman empire 
Introduction 
Historians’ ideas of the ‘age of revolutions’ of around 1750 to 1850 have themselves been 
revolutionised over the past several decades. The ‘age of revolutions’ was first popularised by 
two studies of the 1960s. Eric Hobsbawm’s The Age of Revolution offered an account of a ‘dual 
revolution’, industrial and political, spreading outwards from England and France; R. R. 
Palmer’s The Age of the Democratic Revolution portrayed an interaction between multiple 
revolutions in Europe and North America.2 Since the 1960s, and particularly perhaps in the last 
two decades, the ‘age of revolutions’ has become both more decidedly Atlantic and – perhaps 
more tentatively – global. From much recent work, a picture emerges of a transatlantic nexus, 
now expanded from Europe and North America to include Latin American independence 
struggles and the Caribbean, and re-weighted to give far more importance to imperial factors 
generally and to the slave trade and slave rebellions in particular. Rather than Hobsbawm’s 
diffusionist spread from northwestern European centres, or Palmer’s interaction of distinct 
national revolutions, recent work on the Atlantic sees the ‘age of revolutions’ as an era of crisis 
within a set of transatlantic empires. Syntheses like those of Jeremy Adelman or Wim Klooster 
suggest resolutely transatlantic connections of both a ‘material’ kind (trade, wars, population 
movements) and of a ‘cultural’ or ideational kind (circulation of revolutionary ideas and 
imperial examples), culminating in a mutually reinforcing set of revolutionary events and 
imperial responses around the Atlantic and across Europe. 3 Peter Linebaugh and Marcus 
 
2 E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848 (New York: New American Library, 
1964); R. R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe 
and America, 1760-1800 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). 
3 Jeremy Adelman, ‘An Age of Imperial Revolutions’, The American Historical Review 113, 
no. 2 (2008): 319–340; Wim Klooster, Revolutions in the Atlantic World: A Contemporary 
History (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 1-10, 158-74. 
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Rediker, meanwhile, have suggested that the revolutionary response was the work of a 
similarly transnational actor, an Atlantic proletariat.4 
A further extension of the concept beyond this Atlantic nexus, into a ‘global’ age of revolutions, 
has so far been less secure. Studies have multiplied which treat a wide variety of the world’s 
regions ‘in the age of revolutions’ or ‘a revolutionary age’, and one important collective 
volume on The Age of Revolutions in Global Context.5 But the kind of relationship these studies 
propose between these various localities and peoples and ‘the age of revolutions’ varies, and 
at times is left unclear. One major reason for this comparative uncertainty of the ‘global’ as 
compared to the ‘Atlantic’ wave of scholarship is undoubtedly the fact that the former generally 
concerns peoples operating in political cultures outside the European ‘ecumene’, shaped by 
Christianity and the Enlightenment, within which many (though hardly all) of the Atlantic 
instances can be situated. One kind of solution is that proposed by a recent collective volume, 
Facing Empire: Indigenous Experiences in a Revolutionary Age. While emphasising the 
agency of Indigenous peoples and their imbrication in ‘the instabilities at the heart of the Age 
of Revolution’, the editors accept that what brought these experiences together was the 
common challenge of facing an expanding European empire (in this case, the British).6 They 
make no strong claims for non- or anti-imperial connections between Indigenous peoples, nor 
for their participation in ‘revolutionary’ enterprises which paralleled the political revolutions 
of the Euro-Atlantic nexus. 
 
4 Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: The Hidden History of the 
Revolutionary Atlantic, (London: Verso, 2002) 
5 David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, eds., The Age of Revolutions in Global 
Context, c.1760-1840 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
6 Kate Fullagar and Michael A. McDonnell, Facing Empire: Indigenous Experiences in a 
Revolutionary Age (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2018), 11. 
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It is this kind of claim which is made, though at times ambiguously, in other recent studies of 
peoples outside the European-Christian ecumene, who went through major political upheavals 
in this same period between about 1750 and 1850. Some deal with movements which arose on 
the edges of the Atlantic nexus, but which have so far not been integrated into its 
historiography. Sinclair Thomson has argued that Tupac Amaru’s insurrection in the Andes in 
the early 1780s should be seen as part of the Atlantic age of revolutions; and Paul Lovejoy has 
argued likewise for the series of jihads which overthrew and founded states in West-Central 
Africa from the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries.7 In both cases, these writers 
suggest, the political movements they treat were not only innovative and transformative within 
their own societies, but also analogous to, and connected with, the ‘classic’ revolutions of the 
Atlantic nexus. They also insist, however, on these movements’ distinctive local ideologies – 
Inca sovereignty in the Andes, holy war for pure religion in West Africa – which set them apart 
from the (purportedly) democratic, republican, or Enlightenment-inspired revolutions of the 
Atlantic nexus.8 While both authors outline convincingly some of the ways these ideologies 
flowed together, subsequently, with Enlightenment-inspired ones within the Atlantic nexus – 
the Andean rebellion as an inspiration to European radicals, the role of jihad-influenced West 
Africans in certain slave rebellions in the Caribbean9 – they stop short of suggesting a common 
set of causes for the ‘simultaneity and radical features’ shared by these movements and those 
of the Atlantic nexus.10 Their accounts of the movements’ motivations and antecedents 
emphasise, instead, their autonomous Andean and West African development.11 
 
7 Sinclair Thomson, ‘Sovereignty Disavowed: The Tupac Amaru Revolution in the Atlantic 
World’, Atlantic Studies 13, no. 3 (2016): 407–31; Paul E. Lovejoy, Jihad in West Africa 
during the Age of Revolutions, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2016). 
8 Lovejoy, Jihad, 12, 21, 98; Thomson, ‘Sovereignty Disavowed’, 411, 424-5. 
9 Ibid., 418-20; Lovejoy, Jihad, 27-28. 
10 Thomson, ‘Sovereignty Disavowed’, 412. 
11 Ibid., 408; Lovejoy, Jihad, ch. 2, 98. 
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Two more recent studies go a little further. Toby Green argues that the West African jihads 
and rebellions studied by Lovejoy should be seen as the result of a clash between ‘aristocratic 
and democratic forces’ in a context of ‘rising inequality’, and hence as forming part of the ‘Age 
of Revolution’.12 While making a strong case for West Africa’s integration into Atlantic 
political-economic dynamics, Green does not pursue further the comparison of revolutionary 
episodes. Ali Yaycioglu’s study of political convulsions of the central provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire between 1760 and 1808, meanwhile, draws on hints from Christopher Bayly to suggest 
a possible comparative taxonomy.13 Yaycioglu sees these Ottoman upheavals within a 
framework of alternative responses to political crisis. One possible response was ‘top-down’, 
based on a centralising state; another was ‘bottom-up’, based on communities claiming to 
govern themselves; a third was ‘negotiated’, based on contractual partnership.14 The Ottoman 
crisis which these responses tried to resolve was, he suggests, part of a broader pattern shared 
with the Euro-Atlantic world of the age of revolutions.15 And he implies that the three types of 
response are also in some sense comparable to the political solutions attempted in the Euro-
Atlantic world: rather like Green, he notes their similarity to the three broad concepts of 
‘classical political philosophy’: monarchy, democracy, and aristocracy.16 Yet Yaycioglu does 
not attempt to outline specific causal connections between the development of ‘crisis’ in the 
Ottoman Empire and that in the Atlantic world; nor does he pursue the intriguing suggestion 
 
12 Toby Green, A Fistful of Shells: West Africa from the Rise of the Slave Trade to the Age of 
Revolution (London: Allen Lane, 2019), 401, 428. 
13 Ali Yaycioglu, Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of 
Revolutions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016); C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the 
Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2004), 23–120. 
14 Yaycioglu, Partners of the Empire, 14–15, 240. 
15 Ibid., 4-9, 241. 
16 Ibid., 15. 
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of parallelism between Ottoman political responses and those of the Euro-Atlantic 
revolutionary world. 
This leaves us with something of a difficulty. If movements like those of the Andes, West 
Africa, and the central Ottoman provinces, arose out of local dynamics and logics of change 
quite independent of the classic ‘age of revolutions’, perhaps we should resist the extension of 
the concept of the ‘age of revolutions’ beyond the Atlantic nexus. Their simultaneity might 
then be regarded as a matter of chance, or an effect of historiographical Eurocentrism, as 
historians attempt to force every political upheaval that happened between 1750 and 1850 into 
a common framework derived from the Euro-Atlantic zone: we should instead seek alternative 
regional chronologies of historical change.17 Yet there remains the problem not only of these 
movements’ simultaneity but also of their apparent parallelism: the fact that they have seemed, 
to some contemporaries and some later scholars, to be attempting to do similar ‘revolutionary’ 
things. In an effort to explain this, we might attempt to challenge the idea that these movements 
belonged to separate, local political cultures, and accord a larger significance than Thomson, 
Lovejoy, or Yaycioglu do, to the ideological links between West Africa and the Caribbean, or 
the Andes, the Ottoman Empire, and Europe. 
In an attempt to move the discussion forward, I present here a case-study drawn from another 
region often seen as peripheral to the Euro-Atlantic world: the small Ottoman sub-province of 
Mount Lebanon in the southeast Mediterranean. In 1821, this province saw the emergence of 
two substantial leagues among peasant commoners who refused to pay increased taxes imposed 
by their rulers. They made several political innovations: the idea of a commoner collectivity, 
 
17 As suggested in two chapters of Armitage and Subrahmanyam, Age of Revolutions in 
Global Context: Joseph C. Miller, ‘The Dynamics of History in Africa and the Atlantic “Age 
of Revolutions”’, 101–24; Kenneth Pomeranz, ‘Their Own Path to Crisis? Social Change, 
State-Building and the Limits of Qing Expansion, c. 1770-1840’, 189–208. 
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written pacts binding this collectivity together, and its use of delegates. The first league 
negotiated with the ruling elite with some success, leading to a constitution-like agreement 
binding both commoners and various sections of the elite; the second league was put down by 
force. This instance is instructive because it presents marked parallels with the ‘classic’ Euro-
Atlantic revolutionary developments of a similar period, specifically in the self-organisation of 
commoners for their own ends, and in the use of constitution-like pacts. This fact has led some 
historians to suggest that these Lebanese developments were influenced by the French 
revolutionary or liberal tradition.18 The leagues also occurred simultaneously with a far more 
serious rebellion against the Ottoman Empire in the Danubian and then the Greek provinces, 
which ultimately led to the independence of a small Greek state; and these outbreaks followed 
on the heels of revolutionary risings in Spain, Portugal, and Naples in 1820. This, as well as 
their occurrence within the longer period of the ‘age of revolutions’, might lead us to seek some 
shared logics and causes. 
Mount Lebanon in 1821 presents us with a useful test-case for different conceptions of an age 
of revolutions beyond the confines of Europe and the Atlantic world. I enquire first into the 
possibility of ideological connections: can we attribute the leagues’ political innovations to the 
inspiration of the French or Greek revolutions, or must we regard them as deriving from a more 
local political culture? I then ask about possible links on a more material level: can we see both 
Lebanese peasants and Euro-Atlantic revolutionaries as responding to a shared set of politico-
economic pressures? Based on my answers to these questions, I present suggestions towards a 
possible framework for understanding the age of revolutions within and beyond the Euro-
Atlantic world. 
 
18 See below, nn. 24, 25, 133. 
 8 
Commoners assembled 
Early in 1821, Abdallah Pasha, the newly-appointed Ottoman governor of Acre in Palestine, 
demanded an excessively high sum in taxes from the Emir Bashīr Shihābī, who held the district 
of Mount Lebanon from him as a tax-farm. After attempts at negotiation within a delicately 
balanced system of power-sharing among Mount Lebanon’s own multi-religious elite, Emir 
Bashīr decided to demand the extra money mainly from the Christian peasants of the northern 
part of his domains. But in March, these Christian commoners gathered together at the village 
of Anṭalyās, armed, and swore to resist the tax demands. After negotiations failed, Bashīr 
resigned the emirate and went into temporary exile inland, along with his most powerful 
supporter among the Lebanese elite, the Druze leader Bashīr Jumblāṭ. He left the emirate to 
two rival members of the Shihābī family, Emirs Ḥasan and Salmān, who were supported by a 
different faction of the multi-religious elite. The commoners made a pact with them not to raise 
the taxes, and they were invested as joint Emirs. But Abdallah Pasha grew impatient, as they 
were unable to fulfil their conflicting obligations to him and to the commoners; and he did not 
oppose Emir Bashīr when he quietly returned to Mount Lebanon in June. Emir Bashīr now 
engineered a new pact, involving only moderate taxation, with much of the Mountain elite and 
some commoner leaders from the north-central districts, excluding those further north. He then 
turned to the districts further north to extract his taxes. Commoners here resisted in the second 
league of Liḥfid in the autumn, and attempted to ally with other elite factions. But they were 
decisively crushed by the troops of Emir Bashīr’s ally, Bashīr Jumblāṭ, and harsh punishments 
and fines imposed. 19 
 
19 Sources for these events, cited below, comprise a few documents associated with the rising 
itself; contemporary reports by French consuls and a Catholic cleric; and chronicles written 
from the 1820s to the 1880s. The most detailed studies are Iliya Harik, Politics and Change 
in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711-1845 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 
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The 1821 movements were not without precedent: chroniclers mention earlier anti-tax revolts 
in a central Lebanese district in 1800 and 1805, while lesser disputes with tax-collectors were 
doubtless frequent. 20 But the two leagues of spring and autumn of 1821 were more serious, 
covering several districts of north-central Mount Lebanon and gathering several thousand 
armed men.21 They were also more organised, initiating novel forms of political organisation 
and language. Peasants and other commoners gathered in a large, armed assembly and swore 
an oath of mutual support. They sent messages to other villages or districts urging them to join 
them and send delegates. They also appointed delegates to negotiate for them, and a man of 
rank as titular head; Maronite priests sometimes served as their scribes and may have originated 
some of their organisational forms. Their aim was not to take over political power, but to 
impose their wishes on the Emir and Ottoman state, by concluding alliances with other factions 
and binding the ruling Emirs by pacts not to raise taxes. 22 In this sense their role was similar to 
that of other factions within the pluralistic system of negotiations backed up by violence that 
 
and Axel Havemann, Rurale Bewegungen im Libanongebirge des 19. Jahrhunderts: ein 
Beitrag zur Problematik sozialer Veränderungen (Berlin: K. Schwarz, 1983). 
20 Ṭannūs ibn Yūsuf Shidyāq, Kitāb akhbār al-aʿyān fī Jabal Lubnān (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-
Sharqiyya, 1970), 375–76, 384-5; Amīr Ḥaydar Aḥmad al-Shihābī, Lubnān fī ʿahd al-umarāʼ 
al-Shihābīyīn: wa-huwa al-juzʼ al-thānī wa-al-thālith min Kitạ̄b al-Ghurar al-hisān fī akhbār 
abnāʼ al-zamān (Beirut: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Kāthūlīkiyya, 1933), 1: 203-5, 3: 436-7; idem, Tārīkh 
Aḥmad Bāshā al-Jazzār (Beirut: Maktabat Anṭwān, 1955), 478-80. For a seventeenth-century 
attack on tax-collectors, see Jirjis Zughayb, ʿAwdat al-Naṣārā ilā Jurūd Kisrawān (Beirut: 
Jarrūs Briss, 1983), 12; for a nineteenth-century one, Rose to Catziflis, 7 June 1844, National 
Archives (NA), FO 226/38. For elsewhere in the Ottoman empire, see Jane Hathaway, ed., 
Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2002). 
21 Estimates for the initial gathering at Anṭalyās range from 6,000 to 30,000 men: Shidyāq, 
Akhbār al-aʿyān, 401; Martin (Journal no. 3), 23 March 1821, Archives du Ministère des 
Affaires Étrangères (AE) 306CCC/27 (Seyde); Mattā Shahwān, ‘Ḥayāt Mattā Shahwān’, in 
Anṭūniyūs al-ʿAynṭūrīnī, Mukhtaṣar Tārīkh Jabal Lubnān (Beirut: Dār Laḥad Khāṭir, 1983), 
8; letter from Father Ighnātiyūs Sarkīs, 25 April 1821, Archives of the Sacra Congregatio de 
Propaganda Fide, Rome: Scritture riferite nei Congressi: Ospizio de Maroniti di Roma (SC 
Ospizio) 2, f433r, discussed in Elias Kattar, ‘Les insurrections paysannes au Mont-Liban au 
XIXe siècle d’après les archives de la Congrégation De Propaganda Fide’, Mélanges de 
l’Ecole française de Rome. Italie et Méditerranée 109, no. 2 (1997): 678–79. 
22 Martin (Journal no. 4), 1 April 1821, AE 306CCC/27; Shahwān, ‘Ḥayāt Mattā Shahwān’, 
9. 
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constituted Mount Lebanon politics. But previous factions had invariably been organised 
around the small number of elite families of rank – this was a new kind of political actor, 
referring to itself in terms of the ʿāmmiyya (commoners or commonalty) and jumhūr (crowd or 
populace), and to its own distinct ṣāliḥ (good or interest). 
These distinctive features were later taken up by subsequent popular movements among 
Lebanese Maronite Christians: an 1840 rebellion against the occupying troops of Mehmed Ali 
of Egypt, a sustained uprising against the lords of one district in 1858, and the violence of 
sectarian militias in 1860.23 Hence 1821 can be seen as the beginning of a distinctive local 
tradition of popular politics, one which later took on the varied connotations of Lebanese 
nationalism, Maronite sectarianism, and popular rebellion against ‘feudalism’. It is this later 
evolution that has led many subsequent historians to see the events of 1821, and still more so 
the later movements, as ideologically deriving from the European age of revolutions. Jumhūr 
was after all the term used by Napoleon’s Arabic translators to render the French ‘republic’ on 
his invasion of Egypt;24 and the related jumhūriyya became the usual Arabic term for republic. 
Later historians would read Lebanese peasants’ jumhūr, too, as a republic; the ʿāmmiyya 
became a commune or parliament, and ṣāliḥ the general interest or public welfare; their elite 
opponents represented ‘feudalism’.25 Behind this lay the suggestion that the 1821 movement, 
 
23 Asad Rustum, Bashīr bayna al-Sultān wa-l-ʿAzīz, 1804-1841 (Beirut: al-Jāmiʿa al-
Lubnāniyya, 1956), 2: 173-80; Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, 
History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2000), ch. 6. 
24 Peter Hill, ‘5 May 1815, Egyptian Anxieties’, in The Last Stand: Napoleon’s 100 Days in 
100 Objects, ed. Katherine Astbury, Katherine Hambridge and Mark Philp (Warwick Digital 
Humanities, 2015), http://www.100days.eu/items/show/81; Ami Ayalon, ‘Semantics and the 
Modern History of Non-European Societies: Arab “Republics” as a Case Study’, The 
Historical Journal 28, no. 4 (1985): 821–834. 
25 Khalīl Hammām Fā’iz, Abū Samrā Ghānim aw al-baṭal al-Lubnānī (Cairo: s.n., 1905), 53; 
M. Jouplain [Būlus Nujaym], La question du Liban: étude d’histoire diplomatique & de droit 
international (Paris: A. Rousseau, 1908); Harik, Politics and Change, 213–14, 220; Toufic 
Touma, Paysans et institutions féodales chez les druses et les maronites du Liban du XVIIe 
siècle à 1914 (Beirut: Université Libanaise, 1971), 1: 123-32; Issam Khalifé, ‘Les révoltes 
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like its successors, was inspired at least in part by ‘ideas and institutions derived from the 
French republican tradition’.26 
Certainly some among the Mount Lebanon elite had knowledge – albeit imprecise – of the 
French revolution and its innovative political forms. Emir Bashīr’s court poet wrote an account 
of the French occupation of Egypt, using the term jumhūr (among others) for the French 
‘republic’ and for its ‘national assembly’.27 Not long afterwards, a Syrian Christian merchant 
in Egypt sponsored Arabic translations of French and Greek Enlightenment writings, and at 
least one elite Christian at Emir Bashīr’s court was profoundly influenced by these.28 But he 
also remained staunchly loyal to Emir Bashīr during and after the 1821 uprisings, and was 
dismissive of popular involvement in politics.29 Both wealthy merchants nor court figures, in 
either case, were at a considerable cultural distance from rebellious north Lebanese peasants. 
The elite groups with the closest links to these commoners were their local village shaykhs, 
and the Maronite Catholic clergy who lived among them as parish priests and monks. Some 
clerics reportedly played an important role in the 1821 leagues: the Church and monasteries 
too were exposed to the Emir’s tax demands.30 Maronite clergy possessed networks extending 
 
sociales au Mont-Liban (1820-1859)’, in La Révolution française et l’Orient: 1789-1989 
(Paris: Cariscript, 1989), 49–61; John Chalcraft, Popular politics in the making of the modern 
Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 129. 
26 Joel Beinin, Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 31. For further discussion of this historiography, see Peter Hill, 
‘Asad Rustum and the Events of 1840: Between Narratives of Change and Documentary 
Exactitude’, forthcoming in Philological Encounters 6 (2021). 
27 Niqūlā ibn Yūsuf al-Turk, Histoire de l’expédition des français en Égypte (Paris: 
Imprimerie Royale, 1839), title page, 5, 18.  
28 Peter Hill, ‘The First Arabic Translations of Enlightenment Literature: The Damietta Circle 
of the 1800s and 1810s’, Intellectual History Review 24, no. 2 (2015): 209–33. 
29 See his own account: Mīkhāʼīl Mishāqa, Murder, Mayhem, Pillage, and Plunder: The 
History of the Lebanon in the 18th and 19th Centuries by Mikhayil Mishaqa (1800-1873), 
trans. Wheeler N. Thackston Jr. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1988), 127-9. 
30 Shidyāq, Akhbār al-aʿyān, 401; Īsā Iskandar Maʿlūf, ‘al-Azjāl fī al-Amīr Bashīr al-Shihābī 
al-Kabīr’, al-Manāra 8 (1937): 120; Manṣūr Ḥattūnī, Nabdha tārīkhiyya fī al-muqāṭaʿa al-
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to Livorno, Marseille, and of course Rome; priests reported to the Maronite Patriarch from 
around the Mediterranean on the progress of the Revolutionary wars. ‘What a vast overturning 
(inqilāb) in so short a time!’ one wrote after French troops occupied Rome in 1798: the 
Church’s order is destroyed and the people ‘behave like beasts’.31 Yet as this instance shows, 
their view of these revolutionary events, so far as it is recorded, was wholly negative: this was 
the force which had ruined the Catholic Church, seizing their own Maronite monastery in 
Rome.32 Close to this clerical point of view was a North Lebanese village shaykh with Church 
ties, who was executed for his part in the Liḥfid rising: Anṭūniyūs al-ʿAynṭūrīnī. In 1819 he 
included in his chronicle of Mount Lebanon a brief account of the French revolution and 
Napoleon’s wars – but this expresses only dismay at the ‘great upset and confusion’ of the 
times, the killing of Louis XVI and the attacks on Church and clergy.33 
It is possible that Maronite clergy or shaykhs like al-ʿAynṭūrīnī had heard of the role played by 
Catholic clerics in popular movements – counter-revolutionary more often than revolutionary 
– across the Mediterranean, and this might conceivably have influenced their willingness to 
participate in the commoner leagues. But it seems distinctly unlikely that they would have 
called on French revolutionary models in order to do so – not least because they had more local 
precedents to hand. Al-ʿAynṭūrīnī’s history relates with approval the 1759 rising of Christian 
 
Kisrawāniyya: tanṭawī ʿalā muqaddima wa-thalāthat aqsām (Kaslik: Dār Mārūn ʻAbbūd, 
1987), 247; Shahwān, ‘Ḥayāt Mattā Shahwān’, 11. 
31 Nasser Gémayel, ‘La Révolution française vue par des témoins maronites’, in La 
Révolution française et l’Orient, 258. Cf. ibid, 259-70, and Buṭrus Fahd, Tārīkh al-
rahbāniyya al-Lubnāniyya bi-farʿay-hā al-Ḥalabī wa-al-Lubnānī (Jūniya: Maṭbaʿat al-Karīm, 
1963), 5: 490-501. 
32 See Nasser Gémayel, Les échanges culturels entre les Maronites et l’Europe: du Collège 
maronite de Rome (1584) au Collège de ʿAyn-Warqa (1789) (Beirut: Impr. Y. et Ph. 
Gemayel, 1984), 1: 85-88. 
33 ʿAynṭūrīnī, [‘Mukhtaṣar Tārīkh Jabal Lubnān’], Bibliothèque Orientale ms 1699, 
Université de Saint-Joseph, Beirut, 185, 190. He even reproduces Louis XVI’s heavily 
Catholic testament: 191-6. These sections are omitted from printed editions. On ʿAynṭūrīnī, 
see Harik, Politics and Change, 136-9. 
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commoners in his northern Lebanese district to drive out their Shia Muslim lords and replace 
them with Maronite village shaykhs, including his own father. They had gathered at the 
Maronite stronghold of Ehden and sworn on the Bible and the Sacrament (prepared by the 
Bishop) ‘not to betray, and to spend […] their necks’ blood’ in the cause.34 
One word, one blow, one honour 
In fact, if we put aside the later evolution of the Lebanese tradition of popular politics and the 
‘modern’ connotations which terms like jumhūr acquired, we hardly need to turn to Europe to 
explain the innovations of 1821. Precedents for all of them can be found in the existing political 
culture of Mount Lebanon and Ottoman Syria, either among commoners at village level or 
among the elite. Oaths sworn in churches and written contracts were used to bind peasants and 
lords to sharecropping agreements;35 villagers made written agreements among themselves, or 
with outsiders, over shared resources such as water rights. 36 Written pacts of a political kind 
were used to bind together members of the fissiparous Mountain elite, and to hold commoners 
to a particular elite faction.37 The language of such agreements, stressing unity, penalties for 
traitors, and sacred sanctions, is similar to that found in pacts of the 1821 commoner movement 
and its successor of 1840. The 1821 pact of Bshaʿla village runs, ‘we will all be brothers: one 
soul, one interest (ṣāliḥ), one word, one blow, and one honour’.38 The covenant sworn by the 
1840 rebels in the church of Anṭalyās, in evocation of the oath taken there in spring of 1821, 
 
34 ʿAynṭūrīnī, Mukhtaṣar, 134. Cf. Winter, Shiites of Lebanon, 168-71. 
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37 See Chevallier, La société du mont Liban, Plate XVII and 132-6; Touma, Paysans et 
institutions féodales, 2: 424-5, 431, 812; Yūsuf Ibrāhīm Yazbik, ed., Awrāq Lubnāniyya 3 
(al-Ḥāzimiyya: Dār al-Rāʼid al-Lubnānī, 1957), 86-7. 
38 Havemann, Rurale Bewegungen, 396–97. 
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imposed religious and social sanctions for oath-breaking. ‘If the least disturbance should come 
from us, we will be excluded from our religion and cut off from the community of the Druze’, 
swore the Druze, while the Christians pledged: ‘he among us who betrays, St Elias will be his 
enemy, and his death will not be in the religion of Christ.’ 39 Delegates (wakils) representing 
their principals in monetary and administrative affairs, meanwhile, were employed by 
merchants, churchmen, and the ruling Emir himself. 40 One chronicler suggested that the 
commoners of 1821 adopted the institution from the clergy, via the Maronite Bishop Yūsuf 
Isṭifān. 41 The pact of Bshaʿla appointed a wakil to be responsible for the village’s 
‘commitments and losses’ of money and men to the commoner cause. 42 
Most striking, though, is the novel constellation of terms used to refer to the assembly or 
movement: the ʿāmmiyya (commoners, commonalty), the jumhūr (‘all of’, mass), and their 
ṣāliḥ (good, interest). These terms were indeed taking on new meanings through the events of 
1821, but these can be explained as innovations from within the existing local political culture. 
Jumhūr had long been in use to indicate the totality or overwhelming majority of a group, often 
assembled together for some collective action such as a petition or pact.43 Jumhūr could also 
mean a ‘mass’ or ‘crowd’, particularly an armed one.44 The chronicler Ḥaydar al-Shihābī, a 
member of Emir Bashīr’s retinue in 1821, often refers to the rebels simply as ‘those jumhūrs’, 
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apparently grasping at a term that could describe this new presence on a political scene long 
dominated by a handful of notable houses.45 
The term ʿāmmiyya (sometimes spelt ʿammiyya) can likewise be seen taking on new 
connotations. In documents and contemporaries’ accounts of 1821, as well as of 1840, the term 
is sometimes used simply to mean ‘commoners’: the chronicler Ṭannūs al-Shidyāq often 
employs ʿāmmiyya with verbs and pronouns in the plural.46 Yet his consistent use of this word 
to describe the assembled commoners also registers their distinctive identity as a non-elite 
grouping. This foreshadows the term’s emergent sense as a more or less organised collectivity, 
a ‘commonalty’, as expressed in the pact of Bshaʿla village:  
we whose names are listed below, all of the people of Bshaʿla as a whole (bi-wajh al-
ʿumum), great and small, have been pleased to give obedience and entrust ourselves 
and our money, and whatever may be demanded of us in the matter of what concerns 
the good of the commonalty (ṣāliḥ al-ʿammiyya); appointing as a representative our 
cousin Ṭannūs al-Shidyāq Naṣr […] for our own good (ṣāliḥ) and that of all the 
assembled commoners (li-l-jumhūr al-ʿammiyya)47 
This usage prefigures the later adoption of ʿāmmiyya as the accepted term for the two 1821 
leagues – ‘the ʿ āmmiyya of Anṭalyās’ and ‘the ʿ āmmiyya of Liḥfid’ – as well as for later popular 
movements.48 The term ṣāliḥ, also used in the pact, had previously been used to express the 
‘interest’ or ‘good’ of a particular group: peasants swearing loyalty to a lord had promised to 
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Rustum Bāz (Beirut: al-Jāmiʿa al-Lubnāniyya, 1955), 17; Kattar, ‘Les insurrections 
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‘strive in his interest (ṣāliḥ)’.49 The novelty was in using it in conjunction with ʿāmmiyya and 
jumhūr, to refer to the ‘interest’ of the commoner collectivity, not of a notable faction. 
Are Christians only for paying piasters? 
If the ideas and terms which some have attributed to French inspiration have more probable 
roots in local political culture, there remains another possible source of ideological inspiration: 
Greece. The outbreak of the war which would lead to an independent Greek state was actually 
simultaneous with the 1821 Lebanese leagues. The French consul at Tripoli could write of both 
peasant leagues and Greek risings as part of ‘l’agitation générale’, equally ‘symptômes de 
guerre, de Révolte et d’anarchie.’50 Early Greek revolutionaries dreamed of a rebellion 
spanning the Balkans and the Hellenic diaspora, and attempts were in fact made to draw Mount 
Lebanon into the struggle. In 1820 or early 1821, when Greek leader Alexandros Ypsilantis 
was in Odessa preparing for the Balkan expedition which would initiate the war, he reportedly 
had tentative contacts with Mount Lebanon via a Macedonian merchant. 51 Yet these contacts 
were not with the commoner rebels but with Emir Bashīr himself; and they had no immediate 
consequences, since in the spring of 1821 the commoners forced Emir Bashīr into exile, and 
by July Ypsilantis was defeated and on the run.52 When contacts were resumed in 1825-1826 
between the now-restored Emir Bashīr and the provisional Greek government in Nafplio, the 
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only upshot was an unofficial raid on Beirut by some fifteen ships.53 The notion of a Lebanese 
‘second front’ in the Greek war remained stillborn. 
On the other hand, the main dynamic of the Greek war, whatever the Jacobin or liberal 
inspirations of some of its instigators, soon became that of a Christian rebellion against the 
Muslim ‘Turks’. We might be tempted to see in Mount Lebanon a close analogue: a Christian 
popular rising against Muslim or Druze rule, exacerbated by the Christian-Muslim tensions 
bred by the Greek rebellion. The notion resonates strongly with subsequent Lebanese politics, 
which took a marked sectarian turn from the 1840s onwards. 
The leagues of 1821 were certainly made up of Maronite Christians, and the clergy played a 
part in organising them; the French consul of Tripoli called the first league’s titular leader 
‘General of all the Christians of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon’.54 Their cause was based, in part, 
on specifically Christian resentments. The Druze-dominated districts of southern Mount 
Lebanon had been sheltered from Abdallah’s tax demands, and the burden pushed onto the 
Christians of the north alone, and their clergy and monasteries.55 As well as causing material 
hardship, unequal taxation had implications for the relative status of communities. All non-
Muslims in Ottoman lands were supposed to pay an extra poll-tax for their ‘protection’ by 
arms-bearing Muslims, but this had always been difficult to extract effectively from the 
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independent, armed Christians of Mount Lebanon.56 New taxes for Christians alone could look 
like an attempt to reduce them to subject, non-martial status: as a poet put it, ‘Are Christians 
only for paying piasters, and Druze for fighting with curved swords?’57 Outbreaks of violence 
between Druze and Christians over taxes were reported in central Mount Lebanon in May 
1821.58 Further north, there were older precedents for a quasi-religious insurrection, in the 1759 
rising of Christians against their Shia Muslim lords, which had, by ʿAynṭūrīnī’s account, 
quickly turned into an assault on Shia in general.59 
A rising of Christians, led partly by the clergy and contemporary with the Greek rebellion, 
might thus appear to offer propitious circumstances for a sectarian outbreak. The repercussions 
of the Greek war in Syria, as across the Ottoman Empire, certainly increased tensions between 
Muslims and Christians. After the Ottoman authorities hanged the Greek Orthodox Patriarch 
of Istanbul on Easter Sunday, 1821, governors elsewhere hastened to remind Christians of their 
subject status. In Damascus, old sumptuary laws were re-enforced; along the Syrian coast, 
Abdallah Pasha imposed a poll-tax on Christians, fined merchants, and expelled some from 
Tripoli; more fled into Mount Lebanon.60 Abdallah attempted to disarm Christians at Sidon in 
April, and at Tripoli in July.61  
 
56 Chevallier, La société du mont Liban, 111-2; Polk, Opening of South Lebanon, 43. Cf. 
Touma, Paysans et institutions féodales, 2: 642-45; Cohen, Palestine in the 18th Century, 
249-56. 
57 Maʿlūf, ‘al-Azjāl’, 120; cf. letter from Ighnātiyūs Sarkīs, Awraq Lubnaniyya 2, 416; Harik, 
Politics and Change, 209, 220. 
58 Martin (Journal no. 5), 6 May 1821, AE 306CCC/27. 
59 ʿAynṭūrīnī, Mukhtaṣar, 134. 
60 Mishāqa, Murder, Mayhem, 121–22; Martin to de Viella, 15 June 1821, Centre des 
Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN) 66PO/1/85 (Seyde); Aubin to Martin, 31 May, 
29 June 1821, 66PO/1/86; Regnault to Pasquier, 15 July, 27 August 1821, AE 346CCC/17. 
61 Martin to Ruffin, 25 April 1821, CADN 593PO/1/38 (Acre); Regnault to Pasquier, 27 July 
1821, AE 346CCC/17. 
 19 
Such acts may have added to Mountain commoners’ feeling that extra taxation was an attempt 
to reduce them to subject status. And this may indeed have formed part of Abdallah Pasha’s 
intention, spurred not by Greek events but (one chronicler suggests) by his contacts with 
plebeian Sufi circles in Acre.62 Only around the cities and the coast, though, could Abdallah 
impose his measures directly. In the Mountain, beyond the range of his troops, both Abdallah’s 
tax demands and the commoner leagues entered into a pluralistic politics of elite factions, 
which militated against any simple polarisation of Christians against Muslims or Druze. The 
first league of commoners negotiated directly with Abdallah, and he reciprocated.63 After 
forcing Emir Bashīr from power, they made a pact with his cousins and rivals, the Emirs Ḥasan 
and Salmān (and the Druze elite faction which supported them), according to which they would 
not pay extra taxes. Abdallah endorsed this, investing Ḥasan and Salmān as joint Emirs – 
though he also arranged for their public conversion to Islam.64 The latter was probably meant 
as a token of Ottoman loyalty in the context of the Greek revolt – yet the assembled Christian 
commoners do not appear to have objected, since they then accompanied the new Emirs (along 
with their Muslim teacher and a regiment of Abdallah’s troops) to the capital, Dayr al-Qamar.65 
A few months later, when the two officially-Muslim Emirs failed to deliver the taxes, Abdallah 
accepted the return of Emir Bashīr (widely believed to be a Christian), who concluded another 
pact with the Christian and Druze elite and commoner leaders of the north-central districts. 
When the second commoner league of Liḥfid arose, among the districts further north excluded 
from this pact, Emir Bashīr sent the Druze troops of his ally Bashīr Jumblāṭ to suppress it. The 
Christian commoners called on the (ineffective) aid of both the Emirs Ḥasan and Salmān and 
 
62 Mishaqa, Murder, Mayhem, 106-109. 
63 Shihābī, Lubnān, 3: 659; Shidyāq, Akhbār al-aʿyān, 401; letter from Ighnātiyūs Sarkīs, 
Awraq Lubnaniyya 2, 417; ‘N Latoofs Relation’, f1r col. b-c. 
64 Ibid, f1r col. c; Shidyāq, Akhbār al-aʿyān, 401-2. 
65 Ibid, 402; letter from Ighnātiyūs Sarkīs, Awraq Lubnaniyya 2, 417. 
 20 
their Druze supporters, and the Shia Muslim elite of the far north, their ancestors’ former 
lords.66  
Despite the inherent sectarian potential of an all-Christian league with clerical leadership, the 
commoner leagues of 1821 seem – unlike their successors later in the century – to have largely 
avoided being drawn into a polarisation along religious lines. The Greek events clearly affected 
those in Mount Lebanon to some degree, but largely by way of the Ottoman state and its 
anxieties. The direct effects of the Greek war began to be felt along the Lebanese coast only 
after the Liḥfid rising had been suppressed in November 1821, with the flight of Tripoli’s Greek 
Orthodox Christians into the Mountain and frequent raids on the coast by Greek corsairs.67 
Soon thereafter, Abdallah Pasha himself would enter into rebellion against the Ottoman state, 
and receive aid from the corsairs while besieged in his fortress of Acre.68 In 1826, Emir Bashīr’s 
renewed contacts with the Greeks led only to the brief seizure of Beirut, which he refused to 
support.69 Neither Bashīr nor other Lebanese seem to have been inspired by visions of pan-
Ottoman revolution, and the pluralistic politics of Mount Lebanon did not yet lend themselves 
to a sharp polarisation between Christian and Muslim. 
Extracting blood and treasure 
Instead of French revolutionary ideology or a Greek-style polarisation between Christians and 
Muslims, the Lebanese events of 1821 seem to be a case of innovation from within the terms 
of a local political culture. This culture involved factional bargaining among a pluralistic elite, 
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backed up with violence but also employing oaths and written pacts (however frequently 
broken). In 1821, a commoner collectivity, the jumhūr ʿammiyya, broke into this hitherto elite 
sphere, blending some of its forms (loyalty oaths, delegates, written pacts and correspondence) 
with village-level practices (village assemblies, collective agreements) to forge unity among 
commoners and to conclude agreements with other factions. If ideological influence is ruled 
out, how do we explain its simultaneity and parallels with the broader age of revolutions? 
The possibility of simple coincidence cannot be excluded. But I will suggest here that, while 
ideological connections do not seem plausible, at the level of more material factors it is possible 
to trace common causes lying behind the Mount Lebanon leagues and other revolutions. To 
examine these, we must turn to the original casus belli of the 1821 events: Abdallah Pasha’s 
excessive demand for taxes. This belongs to a larger pattern: excessive tax demands from 
previous governors had also provoked smaller rebellions by Lebanese commoners in 1800 and 
1805. It seems plausible to link these to the intensification of the extractive power of the state 
in the region. 
The eighteenth century had seen a struggle among local elites and corporate groups to extract 
revenue from the increasingly profitable commercial economy of the southeast Mediterranean: 
silk from Mount Lebanon, tobacco from coastal Syria, cotton from Acre and Egypt, rice from 
Egypt, grain from inland Syria, soap and olive oil from Palestine, and coffee entering Egypt 
from Yemen.70 Over the course of the century, the power of the central Ottoman state had 
receded, allowing local magnates in Syria and Egypt, as elsewhere, to centralise and extend 
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their power.71 The rulers of Acre, Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar and later Jazzar Pasha, were especially 
successful: monopolies and close ties to European merchants allowed them to concentrate 
revenue and military force in their own hands and extend their domains, supplanting other 
elites.72 
These magnates’ struggles constituted, in effect, an intra-imperial competition between local 
military-fiscal regimes, which could interact with the struggle between the central Ottoman 
state and other empires. In 1771, as the Ottomans were engaged in a costly war with Russia, 
the Mamluk magnates of Egypt invaded Syria in alliance with Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar, and explored a 
possible Russian alliance.73 In 1798-1799, French revolutionary forces invaded Egypt and 
Syria, facing British and Ottoman opposition and drawing regional potentates – the Egyptian 
Mamluks, Jazzar Pasha, Emir Bashīr – into the struggle. In its aftermath a new force arose, as 
the Rumelian soldier Mehmed Ali succeeded in making himself master of Egypt. The wars of 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries placed great burdens on Ottoman state 
finances, spurring military and administrative reform at both the central imperial and local 
magnate levels.74 There was an uneven but marked intensification of the military-fiscal state 
across the southeast Mediterranean, by way of the tight monopolies and mercenary armies of 
the rulers of Acre; attempts by Emir Bashīr to tighten his control over Mount Lebanon in the 
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1820s; and ultimately Mehmed Ali’s novel extractive regime in Egypt and the conscript army 
he would use to invade Syria in 1831.75 
Rulers concentrated power and profit within a narrower circle: their competition led to frequent 
wars as well as increased demands for revenue, and both bore heavily on the common people. 
Around 1791, a farmer-poet in Mount Lebanon wrote:  
Three years have passed, and all three of them cursed: 
Extortion, war, deep-rooted hunger – these are stern trials. 76 
In addition, these were years of frequent high prices, dearth, and locust attacks.77 These trials 
perhaps seemed worse by contrast with new opportunities offered by the expanding 
commercial economy: the 1790s poet writes of falling into penury from relative prosperity. In 
a period of rising prices and inflation, producers could do well if taxes were paid in cash at 
historic fixed rates.78 But rulers did their utmost to extract revenue from the system, Jazzar 
Pasha gaining a reputation for especial rapacity.79 He and other military-fiscal centralisers 
weakened or destroyed old intermediary elites, replacing them with new ones: chancellors and 
bankers, men adept in the manipulation of money and paper but whose legitimacy was often 
unclear.80 The poet of 1791 went on to blame the Emir’s wealthy Christian chancellor: 
 If only Jadʿūn Āghā were dead! […] 
Everyone curses him, even the monks and the pious. 81 
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Non-elite contemporaries elsewhere in Syria evoked a similar atmosphere of instability and 
conflict, as different elites rose and fell, contrasts between hardship and prosperity became 
more flagrant, and legitimacy was called into question.82 Such polarities may help us to explain 
why certain peasant producers, in north-central Mount Lebanon, would themselves claim a 
place in the competition over tax revenue, previously the domain of the elite. 
These southeast Mediterranean developments fit into a far broader pattern of increasing 
military spending and state centralisation. Behind it lay, most probably, the increase in 
monetizable wealth produced by commercialisation and ‘industrious revolutions’ across 
Eurasia and the Atlantic world, which raised the stakes of inter-state competition. Christopher 
Bayly places Jazzar Pasha and the Mamluks of Egypt, along with Mysore and the Maratha state 
in India, in a group of small, aggressive polities emerging from within the weakening Muslim 
empires of Asia; we might add further examples like Nguyen Vietnam.83 In the Euro-Atlantic 
nexus – including, Toby Green argues, West African polities – a quickening tempo of military 
competition pushed states into autocratic reforms designed to extract more resources from 
populations, provoking political crises.84 The major theme was that of Franco-British 
competition; lesser powers also attempted to keep up, enacting centralising reforms which 
provoked rebellions from the Andes (Tupac Amaru, the Comuneros) to southern Russia 
(Pugachev’s Rebellion of 1773-1775, in the wake of the Russo-Ottoman war).85 The 
culmination of this process was the French revolution and the wars that followed, which led to 
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an unprecedented expansion of military-fiscal power, especially British, worldwide, impacting 
non-European polities and peoples which had not been deeply affected by the earlier dynamic.86 
Logics of response 
Increasing tax demands thus seem to have originated in a dynamic of military-fiscal 
competition, which ranged across continents. But the pressures this generated operated on a set 
of very different, and often separate, political cultures, from the Euro-Atlantic nexus to West 
Africa to the Ottoman Empire. Where ideological links are absent, how can we explain the fact 
that some at least of these cultures responded in what look like parallel ways, involving (for 
instance) ‘bottom-up’ political organisation by the common people, or formal ‘constitution-
like’ negotiated pacts? 
Let us first examine the nature of the response in Mount Lebanon in 1821, when Abdallah 
Pasha’s tax demand exerted a pressure on the emirate. Emir Bashīr al-Shihābī was adept at the 
delicate and sometimes bloody game of Mount Lebanon politics. This involved essentially 
balancing the tax demands of the Pasha of Acre against the reluctance to pay of various factions 
of the Mountain tax-farming elite, while retaining as much revenue as possible for himself. The 
Emir had to avoid alienating either too many of the elite, who provided him with armed support, 
or the Pasha himself, who could side with another faction and elevate another male member of 
the Shihābī family as Emir.87 His qualified independence reflected the economic and military 
balance of power between the Mountain and the coast and plains. The Mountain was extremely 
hard to subdue by outside force, but it was sufficiently dependent on outside trade – not least 
for its food – that good relations were necessary in the long run.88 A powerful governor like 
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Jazzar could play off elite factions against each other, securing ever-increasing promises of 
revenue from weak Emirs.89 A powerful Emir, as Bashīr became through the 1820s and 1830s, 
could build up his own military-fiscal regime and increase his independence of the Ottoman 
governors: armed Lebanese peasants could be a formidable force in regional wars.90 A 
sufficiently powerful alliance of the great tax-farming families, meanwhile, could impose its 
own candidate as Emir. 91 
Success was never guaranteed: Emir Bashīr had been deposed a few times between his first 
appointment as Emir in 1788 and 1821.92 A particularly excessive tax demand could put a major 
strain on the delicate system. How did the Emir respond when faced with Abdallah’s exorbitant 
claim in 1821? First he stalled. He might have considered resisting – as he would do in 1830-
1831.93 But faced with Abdallah’s seizure of hostages, mobilisation of troops, and parleys with 
his rivals, he had to sign a promissory note for the taxes. He then borrowed from moneylenders 
and his rich ally Bashīr Jumblāṭ, but this could only be a short-term solution.94 He could of 
course demand cash from others of the tax-farming elite, but could not afford to alienate too 
many of the allies on whom he depended for military support. (Their coffers, besides, had 
reputedly been emptied by the rapacious demands of Jazzar Pasha.95) Christians at any rate 
would claim that Emir Bashīr was unwilling or unable to impose extra taxes on the southern 
districts because these were the domains of Bashīr Jumblāṭ and other Druze lords on whom his 
power depended.96 The Christian peasants of the northern districts, however, were unprotected 
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by any important elite group: since the expulsion of the Shia lords, their taxes were farmed via 
petty Christian village shaykhs.  
The imposition of the extra taxes on the northern commoners and monasteries provoked a 
temporary breakdown of the elaborate system of clientship whereby commoners were 
incorporated into competing elite factions. Instead of a ‘negotiated’ politics (in Yaycioglu’s 
terms), the Emir’s ‘top-down’ imposition of taxation was met by a novel, ‘bottom-up’ mode of 
organisation. The fact that the northern peasants were protected by no major elite faction 
opened the way for them to organise as a commoner collectivity instead. The local elite, of 
clerics and village shaykhs, was relatively humble and unintegrated into the politics of the 
Mount Lebanon emirate. They were unable either to offer the commoners effective paternalist 
protection, or to suppress their risings – if indeed they wanted to.97 Village shaykhs after the 
second 1821 rebellion would claim that they had been compelled to go along with it, but may 
have been covering for a more active sympathy. One, al-ʿAynṭūrīnī, was killed for taking part, 
as was at least one priest. 98 In any case, the local shaykhs could not or would not provide Emir 
Bashīr with enough military force to suppress the rising, and he had to call on Bashīr Jumblāṭ’s 
Druze retainers. 99  
The presence of an accessible, co-optable elite helps explain how the commoner movement 
could access elite political forms like writing, pacts, and delegates – and hence why north-
central Mount Lebanon in particular should have seen the emergence of this novel political 
form. Similar factors probably favoured the emergence of other episodes of ‘commoner’ self-
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organisation during the age of revolutions. Yet behind such episodes, I suggest, lay 
generalisable connections between ‘top-down’ military-fiscal competition and the 
mobilisations of ‘common people’, which operated across what were often very localised and 
distinctive political cultures. 100 Three logics seem to derive from the dynamic of military-fiscal 
competition itself. Adelman describes one: the imperial drive to compete for ‘frontier’ lands, 
particularly in North America, which drew indigenous peoples inhabiting such lands into the 
revolutionary conjuncture.101 A second logic was military: imperial competition placed military 
personnel at a premium, and they too had to come from part of the common people. Already 
before the revolutionary crises, this seems to have placed some ‘egalitarian’ groups of soldiers 
– Muslim tribesmen in India, Janissaries in Istanbul, armed bands in the Ottoman Balkans – in 
a strong political position. 102 The need for military or quasi-military personnel then increased 
dramatically in the revolutionary crises and wars themselves. This could lead on to new 
political compacts linking citizens’ rights to national military service;103 these might include 
previously excluded groups, such as slaves freed in return for military service.104 Similarly, in 
both urban and rural ‘revolutionary’ politics, crowds and bands of common people, sometimes 
armed, became major forces; even where these operated in the interest of elite factions, they 
might command rewards for their service.105 We can see a logic of this type, perhaps, behind 
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the growing role of Lebanese troops in regional wars, and the Christian commoners’ demand 
to be recognised as fit, like the Druze, to ‘fight with curved swords’. 
Most evident in the Lebanese case is a third logic, of fiscal extraction. The needs of military 
competition pushed states or statelike regimes into more ambitious modes of extracting 
resources from populations. Intermediary elites or corporate groups, part of an older 
‘negotiated’ or paternalist order, were stripped away and replaced by new moneyed men and 
officials who, like the Emirs’ chancellors, often lacked the legitimacy of the old elites.106 The 
extractive power of state or magnate came increasingly to confront, in bare, unmediated form, 
the common people – who were, as Rediker and Linebaugh remind us, the producers of the 
wealth that was at stake in military-fiscal competition.107 This newly stark opposition could 
lead these people towards organising themselves, not as members of corporations or adherents 
of elite factions – entities no longer capable of protecting them – but in more general categories 
such as ‘commoners’ or ‘citizens’. 
These three logics one did not of course operate uniformly or with equal force everywhere; nor 
did they lead to the same outcomes. Exactly where and how they provoked confrontations 
between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ politics was certainly shaped by local political traditions 
as well as sheer contingency. Nothing in these general trends could predict that a newly-
appointed young Pasha, perhaps moved by Sufi zeal, would decide to demand exorbitant taxes 
in 1821, or that the balance of Lebanese politics at that moment would lead to their being 
imposed on the north-central districts.  But we can suggest that many broader similarities 
between widely separated political developments in the age of revolutions can be attributed to 
such logics, arising from the central dynamic of competing military-fiscal regimes. 
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Renegotiation 
The hegemony of the bottom-up organisation of plebeians and commoners rarely lasted long: 
elite rule soon reasserted itself. Yet it did not always do so simply in the old forms of top-down 
politics. Elite groups regained power partly via a process of negotiation and co-optation, in the 
course of which they blended the innovations of bottom-up politics with older political forms. 
This process too is visible in Mount Lebanon. 
The politics of the Emirate had traditionally been the business of emirs and shaykhs, not of 
commoners. When one of Emir Bashīr’s rival emirs asked some Druze shaykhs to join him and 
the commoners of the Jbayl district: they replied, ‘we will not be led by the Christian 
commoners of that country: it would be a disgrace for us.’108 It was probably to gain 
respectability in the face of elite attitudes like this that the first 1821 movement appointed a 
man of rank as titular head.109 But the complex, divided nature of political authority in the 
Mountain meant that the elite did not instantly form a common front against the peasant 
collectivity: many were prepared to negotiate or ally themselves with them. Rival Shihābī 
emirs, their Druze supporters, and the Shia lords of the north were prepared to collaborate 
actively, and Abdallah Pasha to negotiate with them. Emir Bashīr had previously made a 
written alliance with the anti-tax rebels of 1800, securing their aid for his return to power.110 In 
the summer of 1821, some of his faction seem to have made pacts with commoners which used 
the new language of popular interests and representation, alongside an older vocabulary of 
obedience. A pact sworn by a single family in July 1821 to a shaykh loyal to Emir Bashīr 
echoes the language of the commoner pacts: ‘we will be with the whole of the blessed 
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commonalty (jumhūr al-ʿammiyya) […] we will consider the good of the populace (ṣāliḥ al- 
jumhūr)’.111 
But the most elaborate covenant to come out of the interaction between elites and commoner 
movements was made in June 1821. After returning to the Mountain from his brief exile, Emir 
Bashīr gathered notables at the village of Sumqāniyya (where in 1697 the Druze elite is said to 
have met to elect his Shihābī ancestor as Emir). Here he had a pact signed by representatives 
of the eight leading families of the tax-farming elite, plus ‘all the people’ of the Matn, Shūf 
and Gharb regions of central-southern Lebanon. We should be sceptical as to the ‘all’: most 
chronicle accounts refer mainly to shaykhs or notables as participants. But they perhaps 
included some leaders of the first commoner league of Anṭalyās; its titular head Shaykh Faḍl 
al-Khāzin signed.112  
‘Circumstances in the land, the overturning of its condition and the dissension among its great 
men’, the Sumqāniyya pact notes, are bringing about ‘destruction and the ruin of the country’. 
Hence the signatories, the ‘sons of obedience’, have ‘bound ourselves by a bond’ to be ‘of one 
condition, one opinion, one hand […] to set up the good (ṣāliḥ) of the country, remove 
injustices’, and ensure that ‘the outsider’ should not rule over it. If any ruling Emir or tax-
farmer should commit injustices, they will remonstrate with him, and if necessary ‘rise together 
against him’. The country should pay only ‘the original Sultanic tax decreed from olden days’. 
The notables are enjoined to ‘walk according to the ancient customs of [their] forefathers’; 
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transgressors and traitors to the pact are threatened with the action of the group ‘as one hand’, 
and the ‘wrath of God and his prophets’. 
A later document which seems to be a renewal of this pact is still more explicit, laying down 
‘the conditions of just rule’: if the ruler unjustly punishes one of their number, the other 
signatories will oppose this. If he persists, they will compensate the wronged party: ‘we 
undertake to share his loss among all (jumhūr) of us.’ 
If the ruler pledges to deliver payments to the [Ottoman] state without the agreement 
of the whole (jumhūr) of the people of the country – emirs, muqaddams, shaykhs and 
notables of the commoners – other than the Sultanic tax and obligation fixed for us, we 
will not accept any of this, nor accept him as ruler over us – not even if he claims he 
will furnish the payment from his [own] property, because this is what our rulers 
commonly do, and we and the people of our country bear the consequences. 113 
Jumhur here takes on a different sense to that it bears in the commoners’ pacts, encompassing 
not the ‘body of the commoners’ but the established elite, in their traditional order of rank, plus 
the notables of the commoners. Still, these two documents attempt to formalise a principle of 
strict watchfulness over the actions of the ruling Emir – in financial matters especially – on the 
part of the elite and some of the common people of the Mountain. Claiming to codify earlier 
practice, ‘our old way and customs’, they nonetheless constitute a more formal ‘constitutional’ 
agreement than any that appear to have preceded them. Like so many elaborate covenants, they 
seem to have remained largely a dead letter. A few years after his re-establishment in power, 
Emir Bashīr decisively broke the power of many of the Druze notables in a move towards ‘top-
down’ centralisation. More immediately, in autumn 1821, he collected extra taxes – though we 
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should note he imposed them on the northern districts which had not been party to the 
Sumqāniyya pact, suggesting that it protected the southern and central districts to some degree. 
This short-lived pact represents a formalised ‘negotiated’ solution to the problem created by a 
clash of top-down extractive regime and bottom-up commoner revolt. Though conceived 
wholly in the terms of a local political culture, it nonetheless fits into a larger contemporary 
pattern: the rash of Euro-Atlantic constitutions on the pattern of French and American 
revolutionary ones; the 1808 convention between the Ottoman Sultan and provincial notables; 
charters conceded by even staunchly monarchical regimes at the European Restoration.114 
Many such agreements, like the Lebanese one, were soon overtaken by events; but they belong 
to a broader pattern of ‘renegotiation’, designed to stabilise the political order after revolution, 
war, or other upheavals – or to forestall such disruptions. These renegotiated solutions, like the 
Sumqāniyya pact, tended to combine older understandings of politics with revolutionary 
innovations.115 We can suggest that renegotiations, in their various forms, derived from the 
logic of a clash between the top-down politics of military-fiscal regime, and the bottom-up 
politics of the common people. Some would go on to provide new forms of legitimacy for the 
unprecedented expansion of state power through the nineteenth century. 
Confluences and conclusions 
The innovative forms of language and of popular organisation created by the 1821 commoner 
leagues would be blended, over the course of the nineteenth century, with European-derived 
ideas and forms. In 1840, many groups of Lebanese rose up against the oppressive rule of 
Mehmed Ali’s Egyptian state, a more ambitious military-fiscal project than any they had 
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previously known: it sought not only to tax but to disarm and conscript them. In north-central 
Mount Lebanon, commoners followed the patterns of 1821, forming armed bands and 
assemblies and concluding a written pact with Druze allies at the church of Anṭalyās, meeting-
place of the first 1821 league. 116 European powers were coming to play a far larger role in 
Lebanese politics: the rebels, commoners and others, now sought to treat not only with Emir 
Bashīr and Ottoman authorities, but with British and French consuls and agents. 117 In 
exchanges with these, a novel political language was coming into use, involving terms like 
‘liberty’ and opposition to Egyptian ‘slavery’, as well as references to the recent Ottoman 
decree that heralded the Tanzimat reforms. 118 More tellingly, commoner rebels employed them 
in a proclamation addressed to other Lebanese, evoking both the French revolutionary wars 
and the Greek revolt: ‘the Greeks rose up before you, and attained absolute freedom from 
God’.119   
Over the succeeding decades, European-influenced modes of political representation on the 
basis of religious sect intermingled with forms derived from Mount Lebanon’s earlier political 
culture. This blending would influence, among other things, an 1840 pact among the elite, mass 
meetings and petitioning in the 1840s and 1850s, a peasant rising in 1858, and sectarian 
Christian armed bands in 1860.120  As elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire and across the non-
European world, the growing influence of European states and greater familiarity with 
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European intellectual culture led over time to the adoption and adaptation of political 
vocabularies and forms deriving from the Euro-Atlantic age of revolutions.121 It was this 
confluence that allowed later writers to perceive Lebanese commoner movements from 1821 
onwards as expressing French revolutionary or nationalist ideas, or to read pacts among the 
elite as forms of Lebanese democracy or national-sectarian power-sharing.122 
Faced with the apparent diffusion of Euro-Atlantic political forms throughout the nineteenth-
century world, one explanation points to the sheer domination of a specifically European-
centred capitalist economy and bureaucratic state system, which encouraged political responses 
understandable in its own terms – undoubtedly a factor in Mount Lebanon from the 1840s. 
Another suggests that these Euro-Atlantic innovations were more radical and sophisticated than 
those elsewhere, due to the greater intensity of the revolutionary processes from which they 
sprang. But neither of these necessarily tell us how these political forms came to seem plausible 
to other people. A possible answer has been suggested by Andrew Sartori, to explain the 
adoption of ‘Lockean’ concepts by early twentieth-century Bengali peasants. He points not to 
the inherent qualities or even the British-imperial prestige of these concepts, but to the fact that 
they described and explained a set of social conditions and practices – capitalism – which 
Bengali peasants were then confronting. Without necessarily knowing much of the original 
context of English liberal or Lockean ideas, Bengalis found them plausible within their own 
context. 123  
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A similar suggestion could be made for the spread of Euro-Atlantic political innovations of the 
‘age of revolutions’ into other regions. These areas too were participating in the shared 
dynamics outlined above: military competition, the top-down centralisation of extractive states, 
bottom-up organisation by the common people, and renegotiated elite responses. Particular 
Euro-Atlantic political forms, developed in response to these conditions, then appeared 
plausible to people confronting similar conditions outside the Euro-Atlantic zone. Yet the 
instance of Mount Lebanon calls our attention to a further possibility. Here, the shared 
conditions of military-fiscal competition led a distinctive local political culture to create its 
own response – a bottom-up movement and a renegotiated pact – analogous to Euro-Atlantic 
and other responses. Later in the nineteenth century, a ‘diffusionist’ dynamic began, as 
Lebanese adopted European-derived notions and forms of representation, nationality, and 
religious community. But this happened in a context not only of material conditions which 
were converging with those of the Euro-Atlantic zone, but also of locally-produced ideas and 
practices which were themselves innovative responses to the new, shared conditions of 
commercialisation and military-fiscalism. This possibility, as well as that suggested by Sartori, 
is worth considering in other cases where Euro-Atlantic ideas and political forms seem to have 
been ‘diffused’. Where a European-derived element is present (as in Mount Lebanon from 
1840), historians may be tempted to see this as the source of all political innovation, rather than 
asking whether it is blended with an independent, parallel response to novel conditions. This 
is the heuristic usefulness of the 1821 case: it makes clear that such a response was possible in 
the absence of ideological diffusion. 
This study of the instance of Mount Lebanon in 1821 has helped to outline a possible 
framework for the study of the age of revolutions. This framework involves accepting, in large 
part, recent historians’ geographical extension of the age of revolutions beyond the Euro-
Atlantic zone; but it explains the parallel revolutionary patterns across this extended area – 
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including within the Euro-Atlantic zone itself – in terms less of intellectual circulations than of 
shared politico-economic dynamics. Distinct political cultures might respond largely in their 
own terms to the common challenge of rising military-fiscal competition, with its tendency to 
pit top-down regimes against bottom-up political organisation; or they might blend local forms 
with those borrowed from other cultures experiencing similar processes. In either case, many 
of the parallelisms between ‘revolutionary’ processes noted by scholars may be traced less to 
ideological circulation than to logics deriving from the shared process of military-fiscal 
escalation. This put three factors – ‘frontier’ lands, money or monetizable wealth, and military 
or otherwise mobilizable personnel – at a premium, while stripping away the negotiated forms 
which had interposed themselves between the military-fiscal extraction of wealth and its 
producers. This combination could, in certain circumstances, allow the emergence of bottom-
up forms of politics in which ‘commoners’ organised for their own ends; and this, or the threat 
of it, could lead to the renegotiation of the political order. These parallel processes of politico-
cultural innovation, along with the shared material conditions which underpinned them, then 
paved the way for the later appropriation of political innovations from the Euro-Atlantic zone 
which had experienced the ‘age of revolutions’ in its most intense form. 
There remain unanswered questions, two of which seem especially important. First, how far 
can such a model extend geographically, and does it apply only very unevenly to different 
areas? Notions of unevenness might help us explain both the evident differences in outcome of 
revolutionary episodes themselves, and the contrasting trajectories of these societies in the 
post-revolutionary period. Some peoples and regions, of course, must be seen as falling outside 
the model: but rather than simply pointing to them as counter-examples, we should enquire 
why their political dynamics were different. Second, how unique were such processes to this 
this particular ‘age’? Many have argued that the age of revolutions needs to be seen in relation 
to earlier cycles, especially the ‘crisis of the seventeenth century’. Drawing such connections 
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raises the question of ulterior causes lying behind the dynamics of military-fiscalism – to be 
found, it has been variously argued, in demographic trends, climactic events, or cycles of 
capitalist accumulation.124 It is in the direction of addressing such questions, and of testing 
shared frameworks and logics such as that suggested above, that I suggest the ‘global age of 
revolutions’ debate should now move. 
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